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Impacts of Donald Trump’s Tariff Increase against China on Global 
Economy: Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Model  
 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to analyze the possible impacts of the US import tariff against 
China on global economy. The GTAP model is implemented. The simulation 
scenarios depicted short-run effects of full-protection and manufacturing protection 
with appropriate retaliation response from China. On global level, the policy was 
projected to lead to decline in GDP, terms-of-trade, and welfare; and increase in 
trade balance for United States and China. Trade diversion phenomena would occur, 
predicting steep decline in bilateral trade between the two countries and increasing 
export towards their third trading partners.  
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1. Introduction 
The United States’ presidential election on November 8, 2016 had elected Donald 
J. Trump as its 45th president. He was later sworn into the office on January 20, 
2017. The world was taken by surprise considering that Trump’s campaign included 
several controversial trade protectionism plans. These promises were pledged in 
conjunction with his campaign to reclaim the so-called “American Economic 
Independence”. Below are some of his plans, as delivered in his speech on June 28, 
2016 at Alumisource Factory, Monessen, Pennsylvania (Trump, 2016). 
1. Withdrawal of United States from Trans-Pacific Partnership 
2. Appointments of trade negotiators to fight for American workers 
3. Direction of all appropriate agencies to end foreign trade abuses that harm 
United States’ labor force. 
4. Renegotiation of NAFTA terms of agreement to favor United States’ labor 
force 
5. Labeling China as currency manipulator 
6. Bringing trade cases against China’s unfair subsidy behavior to WTO. 
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7. Remediation of trade dispute with China, including possibility of tariff 
imposition against Chinese imports. 
In the same speech, he further claimed that “NAFTA was the worst trade deals 
in history, and China’s entrance into World Trade Organization has enabled the 
greatest jobs theft in history. [..] Almost half of our entire manufacturing trade 
deficit in goods with the world is the result of trade with China” (Trump, 2016). 
United States’ various free-trade deals “like the North American Free-Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)” were claimed to “have destroyed American jobs and created American 
losers” (The Economist, 2016). 
Regarding the last campaign promise outlined above, Donald Trump mentioned 
his planned rate of import tariff earlier on January 3, 2016 in a release by The New 
York Times which goes as follows. 
“In the editorial board meeting, which was held Tuesday, Mr. Trump 
said that the relationship with China needs to be restructured. “The only 
power that we have with China,” Mr. Trump said, “is massive trade.” 
“I would tax China on products coming in,” Mr. Trump said. “I would 
do a tariff, yes – and they do it to us.” (….) “I would do a tax. And the 
tax, let me tell you what the tax should be… the tax should be 45 
percent,” Mr. Trump said.” (Haberman, 2016) 
However, the amount of rate increase has not been finalized or drafted as a 
proper policy proposal. In a later occasion on April, 2016, he explained further that 
“It doesn’t have to be 45; it could be less. But it has to be something because our 
country and our trade and our deals and most importantly, our jobs are going to 
hell” (Appelbaum, 2016). There were speculations whether the plan a was merely 
a bluff to leverage Donald Trump’s bargaining position in trade negotiation with 
China (Jamrisko and Woods, 2016). However, considering that Donald Trump has 
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been putting the idea forward even before the election campaign period, global 
audience took the plan very seriously (Martin, 2017; Noland, et al., 2016) 
This policy, as predicted by several news pundits, will trigger trade war 
between two countries and make way for other countries to follow trade 
protectionism trend since United States is currently at the forefront of trade 
liberalization (Bryan, 2016). The effect can extend further to European countries 
and other Asian countries through various mechanism, most notably through 
international trade and investment (Elliott, 2016).  
This paper aims to analyze the possible worldwide impacts of Donald 
Trump’s tariff increase on United States’ imports from China , as seen from GDP, 
terms-of-trade, equivalent variation, and trade balance of various countries. The rest 
of this paper is organized as follows. Part 2 describes the the US-China trade 
relations. Literature review is presented in Part 3. Methodology is in Part 4. Results 
and discussion are elaborated in Part 5. And finally, Part 6 draws concluding 
remarks.    
2. The US-China Trade Relations  
China rose rapidly to take largest share in United States total trade value. 
By 2015, the country’s share in United States total trade value was 16.2 percent (see 
Figure 1), a rapid surge from merely 6.1 percent in 2000. Conversely, United States 
was also the country’s top trading partner country in 2015 as the country made up 
14.2 percent of China’s total trade value in 2015 (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1 about here. 
Figure 2 about here. 
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The extent of which two country’s import and export are compatible with 
each other can be measured using trade complementarity index by Michaely (1997). 
The index measures how much a country’s export structure matches its partner’s 
import structure. According to the index (see Figure 3), United States import 
structure have gotten more compatible with China’s export structure, making the 
country pair a natural trading partner (WTO, 2012, 30-31). The compatibility was 
also in line with increasing share of China in United States’ total trade volume. 
However, rising complementarity between two countries was only one-sided. 
According to the index, while China’s export has gotten more compatible with 
United States’ import structure, the opposite occurred for United States’ export to 
China. This situation had contributed to deteriorating United States’ trade balance 
deficit with China. 
Figure 3 about here. 
 
Judging from high intensity and complementarity between United States and 
China, it can be inferred a priory that any trade protectionism measures between 
two countries will lead to large trade pattern change in both countries. Due to rising 
domestic import price from China relative to other countries’, United States could 
divert its trade away from China—its natural trading partner—towards other 
countries, vice versa. This phenomenon was coined as “trade deflection” by Bown 
and Crowley (2007). Mechanism for this effect can be modeled using Armington 
import substitution which was used in this research. 
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3. Literature Review   
An import tariff puts a wedge between the world c.i.f. price and importing 
country’s domestic consumer price. The policy is usually taken to protect domestic 
producer from cheaper foreign goods. Rigorous partial equilibrium analysis has 
been laid down by Krugman, et al. (2012: 192-202).  
Assuming world price of a good (c.i.f. price, denoted as Pw) is lower than 
domestic price, the economy will import D1 – S1 in quantity if there is no tariff 
present (see Figure 4). An import tariff will raise the perceived consumer price to 
Pt, decreasing its import demand. If the country’s import quantity is substantially 
large in the world market, the decline in import demand will reduce global demand 
of the good, thus, reducing the world price to Pt*. Hence, the resulting tariff will be 
equivalent to Pt – Pt*. This will lead to less import quantity of D2 – S2. 
Figure 4 around here. 
The area of a, b, c, d, and e represents welfare change from imposition of 
import tariff. Domestic consumer will suffer from decline of consumer surplus 
equivalent to area a + b + c + d. Domestic producers’ surplus will increase by the 
area of a. A tariff is a tax on imported goods, hence, the government will collect 
tariff revenue equivalent to the size of tariff rate times import quantity represented 
by the area of c + e. Triangle b and d is welfare loss due to imposition of a tariff. 
Terms of trade will increase due to decline in country’s import commodity price 
relative to export commodity price. Its gain is reflected under the area of e. Net 
welfare effect is, therefore, will be ambiguous as it depends whether terms-of-trade 
gain (area e) outweighs welfare loss (area c+e). 
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However, the above analysis rested on the assumption of perfectly 
competitive market. In the presence of a single domestic monopolist firm, tariff 
increase will have another distinctive aspect: it allows domestic monopolist to price 
above its marginal cost and domestic consumption to decline while the monopolist 
domestic marginal revenue increases. The monopolist will take advantage of the 
difference between marginal cost and domestic price by selling the gap between its 
production and domestic consumption to world market at world price, creating a 
dumping policy (Rieber, 1981). Armington (1969) proposed a concept of elasticity 
of substitution that will render similar goods coming from different sources as 
imperfect substitutes. This relationship can be represented using constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) function.  
The demand is determined by (1) total demand for good 𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 ), (2) ratio 
between price of the good from 𝑗 source and its average price, (3) share of the good 
from source 𝑗 (𝑏𝑖𝑗), and (4) elasticity of substitution in i-th market (𝜎𝑖). The larger 
the value of 𝜎𝑖 , the more quantity demanded of i-th good from source 𝑗 will change 
when there is a change in relative price of the good from j-th source. “Source” can 
refer to either a country, country group, or domestic-foreign. 
The CGE model used in this paper also incorporates Armington import 
substitution mechanism written in CES functional form. Both between-countries 
and between-foreign-and-domestic substitution nests are represented in this 
mechanism (Hertel eds. 1997, 39-41). If an import tariff is levied, it will alter 
domestic-foreign relative price and between-countries relative price. The change in 
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quantity demanded of a specific source will be governed by its relative price and its 
degree of substitute. 
An import tariff has been proven empirically to lead to decline in import 
demand. USITC (2009) GTAP model simulation found that in the absence of tariff, 
India’s trade with United States would have been around US$ 200-291 higher. 
Elsheikh et al. (2015) study found out that a decrease in Sudan’s import tariff will 
increase the country’s wheat imports. In multi-country setting, a trade restriction 
measure will introduce a phenomenon called “trade deflection”—a decline of 
export to tariff-enacting country accompanied by an increase of export to other third 
country (Bown and Crowley, 2007). The deflection phenomenon was also 
examined and confirmed by Dong and Whalley (2012) and Chandra (2017). 
 Aside from trade flow re-balancing, previous literature also examined 
adverse effect of import tariff increase on various macroeconomic variables. 
Chauvin and Ramos (2012) conducted a MIRAGE CGE model simulation of 
common increase in tariff among MERCOSUR countries. The simulation predicted 
mixed response in GDP and terms of trade. Mahadevan et al. (2017) dynamic CGE 
model simulation of Indonesia’s rising mineral and general trade protectionism 
projected negative impact to GDP, household consumption, and employment. 
Noland et al. (2016) conducted a Moody’s DSGE model simulation of 
United States economy in the presence of Donald Trump’s tariff increase policy on 
Chinese and Mexican imports. The study found out that under the full trade war 
scenario employment will fall more than 4 percent with largest job loss suffered by 
non-trade services sector. The rising unemployment will cause drop in domestic 
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consumption and investment. Scenarios of aborted trade war in which China and 
Mexico concede to United States demands shows softer repercussion to 
consumption, unemployment rate, and GDP growth. However, the research did not 
incorporate the policy in a multi-country setting, focusing only on domestic United 
States macro-economy.  
Prolonged United States-China bilateral trade balance deficit was already 
predicted to spark tensions between both countries earlier in the study by Dong and 
Whalley (2012). Their simulation study of bilateral United States-China tariff war 
predicted shrinking world trade, welfare loss in both countries, and trade diversion. 
They suggested trade re-balancing to alleviate China’s vulnerability from foreign 
trade shocks. 
 In the case of country-specific tariff, there is a possibility for the impacted 
country to “pass through” and re-brand its exports to another non-tariff impacted 
countries. Gardner and Kimbrough’s model (Gardner and Kimbrough, 1990) 
stipulated that a country-specific tariff will not have an impact on welfare allocation 
but simply alters the world’s pattern of trade. However, the effect will not occur if 
the tariff-imposing country adopts rules-of-origin to deter merchandise re-branding. 
 An import tariff is likely to be responded by retaliation from its partner 
country. Scitovszky (1942) argued that by retaliating, a country can reclaim its 
welfare loss generated by partner country’s import tariff. However, as the country 
later recognizes that raising tariff will be responded by retaliation, both country will 
come into agreement of a common tariff.  
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 Post (1987) later extended analysis on country retaliation response by 
assuming perfect foresight—each country expects that its trading partner will 
always respond to changes in tariffs. The model developed various scenarios of 
response ranging from symmetric retaliation to opposite direction response and 
measured the welfare outcome from each option. Although a country could provide 
a respond based on its subjective beliefs on welfare effects, the optimal solution 
that provides highest welfare is by imposing similar tariff increase. 
Does President Trump indeed have the authority to invoke the policy? 
Huffbauer (2016) analyzed its feasibility from legal and political standpoint and 
discovered that United States grants conditional authority to its president regarding 
tariff increase measures. The conditions vary from requiring prior investigation of 
industrial injury by US International Trade Commission, permission from Congress, 
justification of unfair trade, to requiring declaration of national economic 
emergency. Nevertheless, the policy is projected to face numerous objections both 
from Congress and multinational firms. 
The adverse effect brought by tariff increase will cause Trump to “face 
vigorous court challenges by adversely affected US firms and possibly some states, 
arguing that the president had exercised powers and invoked statutes in ways that 
the Constitution or Congress never intended”. The court procedure, however, 
“would be difficult and would certainly take time. Thus, at least for a few years, a 
president Trump would have stronger legal hand and his actions would very likely 
survive challenge in the US courts and Congress” (Huffbauer, 2016). 
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Based on the above literature, simulation scenarios in this research 
incorporated tariff retaliation by China due to it being the country’s best response 
for the policy. Retaliation is introduced by simulating similar level of United States’ 
tariff increase in China import tariff. Rule-of-origin is also assumed to be in place 
to simplify the analysis. The model was adjusted to depict short-run condition due 
to the possibility of court challenges faced by Donald Trump years after the policy 
was in effect. 
4. Methodology   
4.1. Data 
This study utilized Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Database version 9A 
from Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University. The database covers 
140 regional units and 57 sectors (Aguiar, et al. 2016) with reference year 2004, 
2007, and 2011. The latest reference year was used in model calibration. 
4.2. Aggregation 
This research followed default GTAP database sector aggregation mapping with 
further dis-aggregation of “GrainCrops”, “Extraction”, and manufacturing sector to 
provide more detailed analysis (see Apendix for details). Countries were mapped 
into 1-to-1 mapping for each of United States’ major trading partners making up 95 
percent of its total trade volume in 2016. African countries were grouped into 
“Africa”, 28 European Union countries were grouped as “EU-28”, and both 
Australia and New Zealand were grouped as “Australia-Oceania”. Other countries 
were mapped into “Rest-of-the-World” category (see see  Apendix for details). 
12 
 
 Factors of production were aggregated into “Land”, “Skilled Labor”, 
“Unskilled Labor”, “Capital”, and “Natural Resources” category  (see Apendix for 
details). Land and natural resources were set to have limited mobility across sectors. 
To achieve short-run simulation result, capital goods were also assumed to have 
limited mobility (Burfisher, 2011, 137; Adams, 2005). The value of ETRAE for 
capital goods is assumed to be similar with those of land. 
4.3. Simulation  
This study employs tariff policy simulation using Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) model (Hertel, eds. 1997). The 
model can calculate likely outcomes of the tariff policy ex-ante via mathematical 
simulation. Simulation study is suitable for this research as there are currently no 
ex-post data generated from the policy. 
As both China and United States are large economies, their trade policy 
could send repercussions to other countries. A CGE model can capture these 
linkages through price mechanism (Hosoe, et al., 2010, 2-3). The simulation is of 
general equilibrium in nature, meaning that it also captures both direct and indirect 
effect stemming from linkages across different countries and markets. Moreover, 
GTAP model was specifically chosen due to its extensive treatments of inter-
regional trade which is deemed to be suitable for conducting global trade policy 
analysis. 
4.4. The GTAP Model 
GTAP model is a CGE model developed by Center for Global Trade Analysis, 
Purdue University. The full model was introduced in Hertel (ed., 1997). Aside from 
extensive modeling of inter-regional linkages—mainly via international trade—it 
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also models demand for domestic and foreign-produced goods, international 
transport cost, global investment allocation, regional household demand, and 
welfare decomposition (Hertel, 2013). The model uses GTAP database for 
calibration. 
GTAP model followed MONASH-style approach in CGE modeling (Dixon 
and Jorgenson, 2013, 23). Most of its behavioral and identity equations were 
represented in percentage-change form rather than in level-form. The model will 
not solve for maximization or minimization problem as with several other CGE 
models, however, the problem was already implicitly specified within its equations. 
The model’s mathematical functions were derived from constrained optimization 
problem. 
In brief, the model has the following properties (Hertel, ed., 1997; GTAP 
Version 6.2 TABLO Code, 2003). 
1. It models the behavior of firms and three regional households (private 
household, government household, and savings expenditure) in each 
region 𝑟. 
2. Firms minimize their cost of production subject to production 
technology represented in Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
functional form. Firms are assumed to be price takers. 
3. Regional households maximize their utility subject to income from net 
payments of factor use (for private household) or revenue of government 
distortionary measures (for government household). Regional 
household utility is the sum of its three sub-components per capita under 
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the assumption of separate utility from consumption of public and 
private goods (Hertel, 2013, 827). 
4. Private household expenditure are modeled using Constant Difference 
Elasticity functional form by Hanoch (1975) to account for its non-
homothetic preferences. 
5. “Margin commodity” is introduced as a proxy for transportation cost. 
6. Savings from regional household are spent on global investment 
portfolio, with special treatment regarding lack of intertemporal closure 
in the model. 
7. Imports are differentiated by source and governed by Armington import 
substitution elasticity parameter. 
4.5. Computation 
For computation, both GTAP database and GTAP model use GEMPACK (General 
Equilibrium Modeling Package) software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996) developed 
by Center of Policy Studies, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia. In this 
research, runGTAP software—a GEMPACK interface for GTAP model 
simulation—was used to perform model simulations. This research employed 
standard version of GTAP Model version 6.2 (Global Trade Analysis Project, 2003), 
the latest version after several revisions regarding various modeling issues (Itakura 
and Hertel, 2001). 
 This research used Gragg’s 4-6-8 steps solution method with “automatic 
accuracy” option enabled to provide maximum result accuracy (Horridge, 2001). 
The method divides the shock with interpolation into small increments and iterates 
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the calculation several times. The final and accurate solution are obtained from 
average value of each iteration’s solutions. 
4.6. Scenarios 
Donald Trump’s proposed tariff increased policy was simulated under the following 
scenarios. 
1. Full trade protection scenario: United States imposes 45 percent import 
tariff on all commodities obtained from China. China retaliates by imposing 
similar percentage point of tariff increase. 
2. Manufacturing trade protection scenario: United States imposes 45 percent 
import tariff only on manufacturing commodities (“ProcFood”, 
“TextWapp”,”BasicInd”, “MetalInd”, and “HighInd”). China retaliates by 
imposing similar tariff rate increase on manufacturing import from United 
States. 
GTAP model’s “standard general equilibrium closure” was adopted for all 
simulations. Under this closure, price elasticity parameters can respond to shock 
from both supply and demand side (Hertel, ed, 1997, 158-159).  
5. Results and Discussions  
5.1. Impacts of Global Economy  
GTAP Model predicted negative impact to China and United States’ GDP (see 
Table 1). Although both scenarios simulated symmetric tariff increase in both 
United States and China, impact on China’s GDP is larger than those of United 
States’. Manufacturing-only protection scenario generally predicted milder impact 
to GDP compared to full protection scenario. The impact on another countries’ GDP 
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varies from strongly positive (for Vietnam, Mexico, and Canada) to slightly above 
zero. The projection of decline in both tariff imposing countries’ GDP is in line 
with prior studies in the case of US (Noland, et al., 2016) and Indonesia 
(Mahadevan, et al., 2017) while contradicts Chauvin and Ramos (2012) study of 
MERCOSUR tariff escalation case. 
Table 1 about here. 
 
Disaggregating the percentage change according to its expenditure 
components gives a better picture of the change. In China, consumption, investment, 
and government expenditures were projected to decline sharply in both scenarios 
while net export experiences a rise. In the United States, net export was projected 
to decline with subdued decline in investment, consumption and government 
expenditure. (see Table 2). Indonesia was projected to experience mild increase in 
GDP around 0.91 percent to 1.11 percent under first and second scenario, 
respectively. The change is contributed by increase in investment and consumption 
expenditure component. 
Table 2 about here. 
Table 3 reports predicted change in trade balance (in million USD) due to 
the policy. United States trade balance will experience sharp positive change while 
China’s change trade balance is comparable with those of other countries’. EU-28 
countries, albeit reported to experience largest change, comprises of smaller 
changes within its country members comparable to those of other countries in the 
list. Japan and Brazil is the only country that will suffer from relatively large decline 
in trade balance compared to other countries. 
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Table 3 about here. 
Equivalent variation is used by GTAP model as a measurement of a 
country’s welfare gain or loss. Table 4 reports welfare gain or loss for each country. 
Only China and United States will suffer from welfare loss due to the tariff increase. 
This result contradicts simulation results by Dong and Whalley (2012) both in their 
Armington model and endogenous trade surplus model results.  
Table 4 about here. 
Predicted impact to change in terms-of-trade shows similar pattern to those 
of change in GDP (see table 5). Only China and United States will suffer from sharp 
worsening of terms of trade. China was predicted to experience the largest decline. 
Other countries will experience change in terms of trade around zero with Turkey 
being the only country to experience negative change. World price was not 
projected to change significantly, indicating that the tariff war will not yield 
significantly large world trade volume change. 
The simulation result shows that the change in terms of trade is mainly 
contributed by change in export price. The phenomenon is more pronounced in 
China and United States where predicted negative change in both country’s export 
price is very sharp. This is due to decline in both country’s general decline in 
demand, bringing their f.o.b. export price lower. 
There is also a possibility of deflection towards domestically produced 
goods as asserted by Burfisher (2011, 157). She argued that since imported goods 
will be more expensive under import tariff, both countries will shift their demand 
towards domestic goods, bringing down their export supply and increasing their 
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export price. However, the domestic diversion phenomenon is overshadowed by 
overall increase in both China’s and United States’ export towards each of their 
other trading partners. 
Table 5 about here. 
The export diversion effect towards other trading partner (Bown and 
Crowley, 2007; Chandra, 2017) is evident in both scenarios (see Table 6). As GTAP 
model only calculates price change and quantity change for region-specific trade, 
these percentage change in export value is obtained by using multiplication rule of 
price change and quantity change. Bilateral trade between China and United States 
is predicted to experience sharp decline, similar to US-China tariff war simulation 
by Dong and Whalley (2012) despite differences in the effect towards other trading 
partner countries. The diversion is larger in China than United States and in line 
with prediction of larger decline in China’s export price. 
Table 6 about here. 
Literature of trade diversion only mentioned change in export pattern. 
However, looking at change in import pattern can show the impact on other 
countries’ export towards China and United States. Table 7 presents change in 
import pattern. A riveting result is that, under manufacturing-only protection 
scenario, China import will diminish. This result is contrast with first scenario 
where import diversion was predicted by the model. Disaggregating the effect based 
on the commodity, simulation result shows that import diversion for primary 
commodities which were present under scenario 1 is absent in scenario 2. The 
policy under scenario 2 is levied on China’s surplus commodities, therefore, China 
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will not substitute such commodities towards other trading partners. Instead of 
deflecting its import, general decline in import demand as result of general output 
contraction is more pronounced in the projection. 
Table 7 about here. 
6. Concluding Remarks  
This research examined the possible impacts of Donald Trump’s proposed import 
tariff increase towards Chinese imports on global economy using GTAP standard 
model. The simulation scenarios depicted short-run effects of full-protection and 
manufacturing protection with appropriate retaliation response from China. On 
global level, the policy was projected to lead to decline in GDP, terms-of-trade, and 
welfare; and increase in trade balance for United States and China. The results 
confirmed previous news pundits’ predictions of declining GDP and negative 
welfare effect; and was mostly in line with previous trade simulation studies 
involving tariff increase policy. Other country will experience mixed impact on 
their macroeconomic variables. 
 Trade diversion phenomena was present in the simulation results, predicting 
steep decline in bilateral trade between the two countries and increasing export 
towards their third trading partners. Import pattern of both countries will also 
change as well, although under second scenario, China’s import from all countries 
will generally decline. In general, second scenario simulation results show milder 
impact of the policy on all observed variables. 
Simulation results shows that the goal of “Reclaiming American Economic 
Independence” will not be attained by imposing strict import tariff. Instead of 
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enhancing United States economic condition, this research shows that it will lead 
to negative effect towards United States’ economy. As the simulation also predicted 
largest negative effect towards China’s macroeconomic condition, it might be 
beneficial for China to reduce its growth dependence on export (Dong and Whalley, 
2012). Therefore, should any trade dispute arise pertaining China’s dominance over 
world trade such as the case examined in this research, the economy would be more 
resilient. 
 Should the policy indeed take place, Indonesia can take advantage by 
engaging in stronger trade ties with United States and China, considering that the 
country will receive tailwind from trade diversion phenomena from the two 
countries. Textile and apparel industries can also take advantage by streamlining its 
production process as it is the only sector that will benefit from the policy. 
 However, this research has numerous drawbacks. Most of it is due to the 
limitations of GTAP model—and CGE model in general. The model adopted 
oversimplified treatments of firm production for short run condition such as 
perfectly competitive market and uniform production function across sectors and 
regions. Financial market and other monetary components of the economy was not 
included. Further, the simulation should have had included presence of factor 
unemployment, however, as data pertaining factor utilization mostly unavailable on 
global basis, it is impossible to include this aspect into analysis. Adoption of single-
country model might be able to solve this issue with the cost of the simulation 
cannot be done in multiregional setting. Nevertheless, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, this research has been the best possible way to examine the issue as 
21 
 
there are almost no other multiregional trade models available to serve for the 
analysis. 
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Figure 3. USA-China Trade Compatibility Index 
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Figure 4. Graphical Representation of Market Condition under Import Tariff  
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Table 1. Impact on GDP 
Region 
Change in GDP (%) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Australia-Oceania 0.89 0.52 
EU-28 0.7 0.63 
Africa 0.87 0.73 
Rest-of-the-World 1 0.86 
China -4.1 -3.93 
Canada 2.43 2.29 
Mexico 3.24 3.19 
Japan 1 0.97 
Korea 0.9 0.87 
India 0.87 0.67 
Taiwan 0.81 0.79 
Switzerland 0.71 0.63 
Brazil 1.57 0.98 
Vietnam 3.66 3.42 
Malaysia 1.17 1.1 
Singapore 0.62 0.54 
Hong Kong 0.58 0.33 
Thailand 1.04 0.89 
Israel 2 1.93 
Saudi Arabia 0.87 0.79 
Colombia 1.55 1.42 
UEA 0.77 0.67 
Indonesia 1.01 0.87 
Chile 0.74 0.61 
Russia 1 0.9 
Philippines 1.42 1.29 
Turkey 0.44 0.32 
Venezuela 1.42 1.32 
USA -0.92 -0.66 
Source: GTAP model simulation result (2017), processed. 
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Table 2. Disaggregation of Change based on Expenditure Components 
Region 
Weighted Change in GDP expenditure (%) 
C I G NX GDP   
Scenario 1       
China -1.48 -1.89 -0.61 -0.08 -4.07  
USA -0.84 -0.70 -0.20 0.70 -1.05  
Indonesia 0.64 0.56 0.11 -0.21 1.11  
Scenario 2       
China -1.45 -1.77 -0.58 -0.11 -3.91  
USA -0.62 -0.57 -0.15 0.60 -0.74  
Indonesia 0.52 0.46 0.09 -0.17 0.91   
Source: GTAP model simulation result (2017), processed 
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Table 3. Change in Trade Balance 
 Change in Trade Balance 
Region Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Australia-Oceania -3656.16 -2141.6 
EU-28 -33671.11 -27954.12 
Africa -2230.44 -1934.7 
Rest-of-the-World -8477.04 -7482.46 
China -6129.2 -8382.2 
Canada -5390.34 -4709.72 
Mexico -2907.57 -2645.16 
Japan -15385.15 -14024.9 
Korea -3026.27 -2745.15 
India -3477.06 -2741.36 
Taiwan -347.49 -291.45 
Switzerland -824.81 -664.99 
Brazil -7696.42 -4017.27 
Vietnam -2788.98 -2614.29 
Malaysia -1294.45 -1200.49 
Singapore 149.55 104.71 
Hong Kong -461.01 -349.5 
Thailand -1197.26 -1109.45 
Israel -1178.93 -1059.72 
Saudi Arabia 997.96 1008.25 
Colombia -800.42 -717.34 
UEA -804.95 -717.21 
Indonesia -1743.13 -1407.05 
Chile -300.24 -220.83 
Russia -3172.77 -2744.74 
Philippines -1036.56 -913.78 
Turkey -1051.08 -805.22 
Venezuela -302.91 -261.02 
USA 108203.75 92742.91 
Source: GTAP model simulation result (2017), processed. 
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Table 4. Equivalent Variation 
Region Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Australia-Oceania 2078.51 476.1 
EU-28 14419.18 13130.71 
Africa 4665.28 4320.04 
Rest-of-the-World 15232.55 14119.64 
China -100994.8 -94061.28 
Canada 8739.55 7709.65 
Mexico 7887.86 7626.97 
Japan 7038.48 7015.53 
Korea 2591.64 2521.56 
India 2108.03 1454.4 
Taiwan 964.4 913.82 
Switzerland 428.18 367.49 
Brazil 4288.02 1962.76 
Vietnam 2584.54 2452.52 
Malaysia 1543.79 1487.98 
Singapore 340.4 256.75 
Hong Kong 786.1 493.54 
Thailand 1028.02 856.2 
Israel 1321.64 1279.76 
Saudi Arabia 2426.23 2444.18 
Colombia 604.85 572.67 
UEA 1724.22 1673.53 
Indonesia 1370.57 983.21 
Chile 254.97 116.61 
Russia 5370.94 5292.72 
Philippines 668.61 612.38 
Turkey 31.51 -214.57 
Venezuela 879.08 857.59 
USA -90881.03 -79528.23 
Source: GTAP model simulation result (2017), processed. 
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Table 5.  Terms of Trade Change 
Region 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
World 
Price 
Contrib. 
Export 
price 
contrib. 
Import 
price 
contrib 
Terms-of-
trade 
World 
Price 
Contrib. 
Export 
price 
contrib. 
Import 
price 
contrib 
Terms-of-
trade 
Australia-
Oceania 0.05 0.25 -0.22 0.52 -0.06 -0.02 -0.22 0.13 
EU-28 -0.06 0.28 0.05 0.16 -0.06 0.25 0.05 0.14 
Africa 0.43 0.22 -0.16 0.81 0.42 0.16 -0.17 0.75 
Rest-of-the-
World 0.34 0.33 -0.07 0.74 0.33 0.28 -0.08 0.69 
China -0.23 -2.55 0.26 -3.03 -0.22 -2.51 0.22 -2.94 
Canada 0.13 1.16 -0.26 1.56 0.13 1.14 -0.11 1.39 
Mexico 0.02 1.8 -0.33 2.16 0.03 1.87 -0.17 2.08 
Japan -0.25 0.51 -0.42 0.69 -0.22 0.51 -0.4 0.69 
Korea -0.25 0.28 -0.3 0.33 -0.22 0.28 -0.28 0.34 
India -0.29 0.42 -0.19 0.32 -0.29 0.31 -0.18 0.21 
Taiwan -0.21 0.34 -0.17 0.3 -0.2 0.35 -0.13 0.29 
Switzerland 0.01 0.31 0.18 0.14 0.01 0.28 0.16 0.13 
Brazil 0.02 0.85 -0.15 1.02 -0.02 0.25 -0.13 0.36 
Vietnam 0.02 1.14 -0.44 1.6 0.01 1.04 -0.44 1.49 
Malaysia 0.07 0.38 -0.17 0.62 0.06 0.37 -0.18 0.61 
Singapore -0.13 0.15 -0.08 0.11 -0.13 0.13 -0.08 0.08 
Hong Kong 0.05 0.08 -0.32 0.44 0.03 -0.05 -0.3 0.29 
Thailand -0.13 0.37 -0.13 0.37 -0.14 0.31 -0.13 0.3 
Israel -0.08 1.05 -0.05 1.02 -0.07 1.04 -0.02 0.99 
Saudi Arabia 0.83 0.1 -0.09 1.01 0.84 0.09 -0.08 1.01 
Colombia 0.39 0.39 -0.03 0.8 0.36 0.43 0.01 0.78 
UEA 0.63 0.11 -0.14 0.88 0.63 0.09 -0.15 0.87 
Indonesia 0.09 0.4 -0.2 0.68 0.01 0.32 -0.19 0.52 
Chile -0.04 0.13 -0.2 0.29 -0.09 0.06 -0.17 0.15 
Russia 0.62 0.25 -0.11 0.98 0.61 0.24 -0.12 0.98 
Philippines -0.14 0.59 -0.23 0.67 -0.13 0.52 -0.23 0.62 
Turkey -0.19 0.2 0 0.02 -0.21 0.16 0.03 -0.07 
Venezuela 0.74 0.36 -0.09 1.19 0.74 0.34 -0.09 1.17 
USA -0.09 -0.66 0.32 -1.06 -0.08 -0.31 0.29 -0.68 
Source: GTAP model simulation output (2017), processed. 
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Table 6. Trade Diversion (Export) 
Destination Region 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
China Export US Export China Export US Export 
Australia-Oceania 11.72 4.14 11.33 0.55 
EU-28 12.52 5.37 12.86 2.03 
Africa 12.33 4.85 12.55 1.59 
Rest-of-the-World 12.59 5.10 12.87 2.02 
China 15.55 -83.94 8.56 -35.66 
Canada 12.15 4.04 13.83 2.83 
Mexico 13.47 5.20 15.54 4.16 
Japan 10.35 2.92 11.13 0.62 
Korea 10.23 2.77 11.03 0.46 
India 12.22 4.82 12.25 1.39 
Taiwan 10.95 3.02 12.14 1.16 
Switzerland 13.17 5.82 13.48 2.45 
Brazil 13.36 5.91 12.81 1.94 
Vietnam 13.39 5.84 13.52 2.65 
Malaysia 11.76 4.27 11.81 1.17 
Singapore 11.82 4.03 12.00 1.14 
Hong Kong 10.58 2.88 11.13 0.28 
Thailand 12.05 4.27 12.16 1.21 
Israel 13.16 5.48 13.90 2.86 
Saudi Arabia 12.87 5.22 13.14 2.18 
Colombia 13.21 5.24 14.13 2.89 
UEA 12.11 4.52 12.38 1.48 
Indonesia 12.32 4.76 12.45 1.77 
Chile 11.30 4.06 11.67 0.93 
Russia 12.81 5.24 13.00 2.06 
Philippines 12.49 4.97 12.53 1.76 
Turkey 12.01 4.30 12.75 1.68 
Venezuela 14.22 6.34 14.58 3.26 
USA -83.78 11.40 -26.49 8.22 
Note: All values are expressed in all-commodity percentage change average of f.o.b. export value 
Source: GTAP model simulation output (2017); processed 
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Table 7. Trade Diversion (Import) 
Destination Region 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
China Import US Import China Import US Import 
Australia-Oceania 1.82 5.83 -3.46 7.29 
EU-28 2.21 6.12 -4.34 6.27 
Africa 1.45 5.34 -4.78 5.74 
Rest-of-the-World 1.28 5.05 -5.01 5.39 
China 15.55 -83.68 8.56 -26.37 
Canada -0.93 2.30 -7.47 2.44 
Mexico -2.27 0.44 -9.55 -0.03 
Japan 2.22 6.00 -4.70 5.82 
Korea 3.13 6.91 -3.94 6.70 
India 1.64 5.50 -4.40 6.09 
Taiwan 2.81 6.53 -4.35 6.19 
Switzerland 2.06 5.89 -4.56 5.97 
Brazil -0.23 3.41 -4.97 5.45 
Vietnam -1.87 1.71 -7.78 2.26 
Malaysia 1.80 5.65 -4.63 5.90 
Singapore 3.05 6.83 -3.68 6.90 
Hong Kong 3.13 6.91 -3.53 7.16 
Thailand 1.62 5.52 -4.38 6.15 
Israel -0.27 3.31 -6.85 3.30 
Saudi Arabia 1.63 5.57 -4.85 5.73 
Colombia 0.19 3.76 -6.55 3.70 
UEA 2.16 6.07 -4.36 6.25 
Indonesia 1.28 4.95 -5.01 5.35 
Chile 2.81 6.75 -3.81 6.97 
Russia 1.16 4.97 -5.26 5.19 
Philippines 0.53 4.19 -5.62 4.60 
Turkey 2.84 6.75 -3.76 6.93 
Venezuela -0.75 2.94 -7.04 3.11 
USA -83.81 11.40 -35.63 8.22 
Note: All values are expressed in all-commodity percentage change average of c.i.f. import value 
Source: GTAP model simulation output (2017); processed 
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Appendix 
Sector Aggregation Mapping 
Aggregation Name Group Description 
GTAP Sector 
Code 
Disaggregated Sectors 
Grains Basic primary grains crops pdr Paddy rice 
wht Wheat 
gro Cereal grains, not elsewhere classified (n.e.c) 
Crops Horticulture products, farm 
crops 
v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
osd Oil seeds 
c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet 
pfb Plant-based fibers 
ocr Crops n.e.c 
MeatLstk Meat, animal products from 
farms 
ctl Cattle, sheep, goats, gorses 
oap Animal products, n.e.c 
rmk Raw milk 
wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
cmt Meat, cattle, sheep, goats, horse 
omt Meat products, n.e.c. 
Extraction Extraction and mining products frs Forestry 
fsh Fishing 
coa Coal 
omn Minerals, n.e.c 
OilGas Oil and gas oil Oil 
gas Gas 
ProcFood Processed food products vol Vegetable oils and fats 
mil Dairy products 
pcr Processed rice 
sgr Sugar 
ofd Food products, n.e.c. 
b_t Beverages and tobacco products 
TextWapp Textile and apparel products tex Textiles 
wap Wearing apparel 
BasicInd Basic manufacturing producing 
raw or primary materials 
lea Leather products 
lum Wood products 
ppp Paper products, publishing 
p_c Petroleum, coal products 
crp Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
nmm Mineral products n.e.c. 
MetalInd Metal manufacturing i_s Ferrous metals 
nfm Metals n.e.c. 
fmp Metal products 
HighInd High-tech manufacturing mvh Motor vehicles and parts 
otn Transport equipment n.e.c. 
ele Electronic equipment 
ome Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
omf Manufactures n.e.c. 
Util_Cons Utility and construction sector ely Electricity 
gdt Gas manufacture, distribution 
wtr Water 
cns Construction 
TransComm Transport and communication 
sector 
trd Trade 
otp Transport n.e.c. 
wtp Sea transport 
atp Air transport 
cmn Communication 
OthServices Other services sector ofi Financial services n.e.c. 
isr Insurance 
obs Business services n.e.c. 
ros Recreation and other services 
osg Public 
administration/defense/health/education 
dwe Dwellings 
Source: Author’s specification from GTAP 9 Database; Aguiar, et al. (2016) 
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Regional Aggregation Mapping 
Regions Members 
AusOce Australia, New Zealand, Other Oceania 
EU_28 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania 
Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Rest-of-Western 
Africa, Central Africa, South Central Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of Eastern Africa, Botswana, 
Namibia, South Africa, Rest of South African Countries. 
China China 
Canada Canada 
Mexico Mexico 
Japan Japan 
Korea Korea 
India India 
Taiwan Taiwan 
Switzerland Switzerland 
Brazil Brazil 
Vietnam Vietnam 
Malaysia Malaysia 
Singapore Singapore 
Hongkong Hong Kong 
Thailand Thailand 
Israel Israel 
SaudiArb Saudi Arabia 
Colombia Colombia 
UEA UEA 
Indonesia Indonesia 
Chile Chile 
Russia Russia 
Phlpns Philippines 
Turkey Turkey 
Venzuela Venezuela 
USA USA 
ROW Other countries not specified above 
 Source: Author’s specification from GTAP 9 Database 
 
Factors of Production Aggregation Mapping 
Factor of Production Aggregation Group Factor Mobility 
Land “Land” Sluggish  
(𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐸 = −1) 
Technicians, Associates, 
Professionals Skilled Labor 
“SkLabor” 
Mobile 
Officials and Managers, 
Agricultural and Unskilled 
Unskilled Labor 
“UnSkLabor” 
Mobile Clerks 
Service / Shop workers 
Capital “Capital” 
Sluggish (𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐸 = −1) 
Natural Resources Natural Resources 
“NatRes” 
Sluggish 
(𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐸 = −0.001) 
Source: Author’s specification from GTAP 9 Database 
 
